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The	  legitimacy	  gaps	  that	  afflict	  international	  organizations	  (IOs)	  are	  widely	  recognized	  (Scholte	  2011;	  Reus-­‐
Smit	   2007).	   In	   its	  most	   pessimistic	   form,	   the	   argument	   is	   that	   international	   organizations	   are	   unlikely	   to	  
gain	   legitimacy	   because	   they	   are	   detached	   from	   the	   principal	   arena	   of	   democratically	   legitimate	   policy	  
making	   under	   representative	   government	  where	   citizens	   can	   participate	   in	   the	   policy	   decisions	   affecting	  
their	   everyday	   lives	   (Dahl	   1994).	   IOs	   operate	   outside	   the	   classic	   ‘democratic	   circuit’	   (Schmidt	   2006;	   also	  
Heritier	   and	   Lehmkuhl	   2011)	   and	   therefore	   lack	  what	   Jackie	   Smith	   (2008:	   11)	   calls	   ‘external	   legitimacy’,	  
meaning	  that	  they	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  popular	  consent	  and	  control.	  
In	  a	  less	  pessimistic	  fashion,	  the	  argument	  is	  that	  IOs	  are	  endowed	  with	  a	  stock	  of	  legitimacy	  that	  
derives	  from	  the	  act	  of	  delegation	  of	  its	  principals.	  Over	  time,	  however,	  many	  factors	  may	  contribute	  to	  the	  
erosion	   of	   IOs	   legitimacy.	   For	   instance,	   it	   has	   been	   found	   that	   legitimacy	   decreases	   if	   member	   states’	  
perception	  is	  that	  they	  are	  controlled	  by	  the	  great	  powers	  (Johnson	  2011)	  or	  if	  the	  IO	  fails	  in	  dealing	  with	  
the	  problems	  it	   is	  meant	  to	  address,	  such	  as	  failing	  to	  adapt	  to	  new	  economic	  realities	  (Seabrooke	  2007).	  
Furthermore,	   no	   published	   record	   of	   activity	   and	   decision-­‐making	   positions	   as	   well	   as	   limited	   public	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Although the paper is the result of joint efforts, each author holds primary responsibility for specific sections. In 
particular, Guastaferro (section 2, 3, and 5) and Moschella (section 1, 2.2, and 4).  
participation	   to	   the	   IO	  decision	  making	  often	  weaken	  perceptions	  of	   legitimacy	   (Karns	   and	  Mingst	   2010:	  
549).	  
Decreasing	  levels	  of	  legitimacy	  constitute	  a	  serious	  problem	  for	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  IO.	  That	  is	  
to	  say,	  if	  the	  IO	  does	  not	  garner	  sufficient	  political	  support,	  the	  success	  of	  its	  actions	  is	  at	  risk.	  Indeed,	  as	  it	  
widely	   recognized,	  governing	  bodies	  must	  be	  viewed	  as	   legitimate	   institutions	  as	  effective	  government	   is	  
dependent	   on	   people	   voluntarily	   obeying	   the	   law	   (Easton	   1958;	   Tyler	   1990).	   As	   a	   result,	   IOs	   that	   lack	  
legitimacy	  tend	  to	  experience	  difficulties	  in	  implementing	  their	  policies	  (Backstrand	  2008:	  79;	  Zürn	  2002).	  
These	  considerations	  have	  sparked	  an	  intense	  debate	  regarding	  the	  modalities	  through	  which	  the	  
legitimacy	   of	   IOs	   can	   be	   improved	   even	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   the	   democratic	   mechanism	   of	   election.	   The	  
purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  thus	  that	  of	  analyzing	  the	  legitimacy-­‐enhancing	  strategies	  that	  IOs	  have	  commonly	  
adopted	  and	   to	  provide	   a	   theoretical	   assessment	  of	   these	   strategies	   as	   remedial	  measures	   to	   legitimacy	  
deficits.	  	  
Based	  on	  a	  focused	  comparison	  between	  two	  prominent	  international	  institutions	  –	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  
IMF	  –	  the	  paper	  will	  argue	  and	  illustrate	  that	  the	  process	  of	  enhancing	  IOs	  legitimacy	  has	  unfolded	  through	  
the	   application	   of	   two	  main	   strategies	   among	   others.	   The	   first	   strategy	   has	   been	   that	   of	   expanding	   the	  
number	  of	  participants	  to	  the	  EU	  and	  IMF	  decision-­‐making	  processes.	  The	  second	  strategy	  is	  related	  to	  the	  
process	  of	  delegation	  through	  which	  principals	  (member	  states)	  authorize	  their	  agents	  (the	  organizations)	  –	  
a	  process	  that	  is	  based,	  among	  other	  factors,	  on	  the	  need	  for	  expert	  information	  to	  policy-­‐makers	  (Epstein	  
and	  O’Halloran	  1994,	  1999;	  Huber	  1998).	  Indeed,	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  IMF	  have	  deepened	  their	  expertise	  over	  
time	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  the	  benefits	  delivered	  to	  the	  principals.	  In	  short,	  legitimacy	  has	  been	  considered	  a	  
function	   of	   the	   output	   produced	   by	   the	   ‘expert’	   IO	   and	   has	   been	   related	   to	   the	   IO’s	   problem-­‐solving	  
effectiveness	  (Scharpf	  2003).	  
While	   both	   strategies	   certainly	   deserve	   merit	   for	   having	   explicitly	   addressed	   legitimacy-­‐deficits,	  
offering	  a	  useful	  blueprint	  for	  conceiving	  of	  legitimacy	  beyond	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  these	  strategies	  suffer	  from	  
some	  major	  weaknesses.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   participation	   is	   far	   from	   being	   representative	   of	   all	   relevant	  
interests	   but	   is	   still	   highly	   selective.	   As	   has	   been	   noted,	   one	   of	   the	   problems	   of	   legitimacy-­‐enhancing	  
strategies	  based	  on	  participation	  is	  that	  they	  do	  not	  guarantee	  equal	  access	  to	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  
especially	  when	  some	  individuals	  or	  groups	  lack	  the	  conditions	  to	  participate	  effectively	  or	  to	  participate	  at	  
all.2	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  increasing	  emphasis	  on	  expertise	  has	  allowed	  IOs	  to	  insulate	  themselves	  from	  
political	  accountability	  even	  when	  the	  output	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  is	  harmful	  of	  broad	  public	  interest.3	  	  
In	   short	   and	   here	   is	   the	   argument	   we	   advance	   in	   this	   paper,	   the	   problem	   with	   the	   legitimacy-­‐
enhancing	  strategies	  based	  on	  participation	  and	  expertise	   lies	   in	  the	  fact	  that	   they	  fail	   to	  ensure	  that	   IOs	  
are	  representative	  of	  the	  interests	  of	  their	  members	  and	  responsive	  to	  them.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  say	  that	  these	  
strategies	  cannot	  ensure	  the	  bidirectional-­‐	  link	  between	  rulers	  and	  ruled	  that	  that	  stands	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  
concept	  of	  representation	  (on	  the	  relational	  nature	  of	  representation	  see	  Mansbridge	  2011).	  Seen	  from	  this	  
perspective,	   we	   do	   not	   claim	   that	   the	   strategies	   based	   on	   participation	   and	   expertise	   are	   useless	   to	  
enhance	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  IOs.	  More	  narrowly,	  we	  argue	  that	  these	  strategies	  are	  problematic	  to	  the	  extent	  
that	   they	   lack	   the	   mechanisms	   through	   which	   member	   states	   can	   effectively	   authorize	   the	   IO	   in	  
representing	   their	   interests	   and	   control	   the	   IO	   in	   the	   output	   it	   produces.4	   Participation	   and	   expertise	  
cannot	  be	  disconnected	  from	  the	  principle	  of	  representation	  if	  they	  are	  to	  achieve	  the	  legitimation	  of	  IOs.	  
In	  what	  follows,	  we	  illustrate	  these	  arguments	  by	  reviewing	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  IMF	  
have	   attempted	   to	   (re)gain	   or	   improve	   their	   legitimacy.	   Particular	   attention	   will	   be	   devoted	   to	   recent	  
innovations	  in	  this	  quest	  for	  legitimacy.	  Indeed,	  both	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  IMF	  have	  recently	  turned	  to	  measures	  
that	  aim	  at	  improving	  the	  principle	  of	  representation	  in	  their	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  activities.	  While	  it	  is	  probably	  too	  
early	  to	  assess	  whether	  this	  ‘representative	  turn’	  will	  redress	  the	  legitimacy	  deficits	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  IMF,	  
the	  measures	  adopted	  are	  nonetheless	  an	  interesting	  development	  because	  they	  demonstrate	  the	  limits	  of	  
the	  two	  strategies	  pursued	  thus	  far.	  The	  comparison	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  IMF	  rests	  on	  the	  observation	  
that	   both	   organizations	   have	   faced	   serious	   protests	   and	   external	   criticisms.	   The	   anti-­‐globalization	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See, for instance, the discussion in Rehfeld (2011: 634). 
3 The criticism according to which delegation to expertise allows politicians to escape accountability for the public 
policy they adopt is not exclusively leveled against international bodies. Rather, the criticism has been developed with 
regard to domestic political systems (Schoenbrod 1993). 
4 On the issue of accountability at the global level see, in particular, Grant and Keohane (2005).  
demonstrators	  have	  signaled	   their	   concerns	  about	   the	  undemocratic	   character	  of	  both	   the	  Fund	  and	   the	  
EU.	   Furthermore,	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   IMF	   are	   probably	   among	   the	   most	   influential	   organizations	   on	   the	  
economic	  choices	  of	  its	  members	  and	  well-­‐being	  of	  domestic	  societies,	  primarily	  because	  of	  the	  sanctioning	  
and	  surveillance	  mechanisms	  they	  posses.	  
Before	  proceeding,	   two	  clarifications	  are	   in	  order.	  Firstly,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  clarify	  how	  this	  paper	  
conceives	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  concepts	  of	   legitimacy	  and	  representation,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  
democracy,	  on	  the	  other.	  Specifically,	  our	  view	  is	  that	  the	  former	  are	  to	  be	  conceived	  independently	  from	  
democratic	  concerns.	   Indeed,	  as	  Andrew	  Rehfeld	  (2006)	  has	  convincingly	  argued,	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  think	  of	  
many	  cases	  in	  which	  political	  representation	  is	  at	  play	  outside	  of	  the	  normal	  institutions	  of	  representative	  
government	  which,	   in	  turn,	   is	  meant	  to	  achieve	  a	  democratic	  form	  (see	  also	  Rehfeld	  2011	  640).5	   In	  short,	  
we	  should	  not	  confuse	  legitimacy	  and	  representation	  with	  the	  conditions	  that	  make	  a	  society	  democratic.	  
Forms	   of	   legitimation	   and	   political	   representation	   exist	   well	   outside	   democratic	   contexts,	   both	   in	   non-­‐
democratic	   systems	   (for	   instance,	   Urbinati	   and	  Warren	   2008)	   and	   in	   the	   international	   context	   (Rehfeld	  
2006).	   Hence,	   in	   elaborating	   the	   concept	   of	   representation,	   we	   deliberately	   design	   it	   in	   a	   way	   that	  
distinguishes	  it	  from	  democratic	  principles.	  	  
Secondly,	   although	   we	   analyze	   the	   legitimacy-­‐enhancing	   strategies	   used	   by	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   IMF	  
since	  their	  creation	  till	  present,	  the	  paper	  does	  not	  aim	  at	  providing	  an	  empirical	  measure	  of	  the	  size	  of	  the	  
legitimacy	  deficits	   in	   the	   two	  organizations.	  Likewise,	   the	  paper	   is	  not	  meant	   to	  assess	   the	  causal	   factors	  
behind	   the	   decisions	   to	   adopt	   specific	   strategies	   over	   the	   others.	   More	   narrowly,	   we	   are	   interested	   in	  
identifying	  patterns	  of	  legitimacy-­‐enhancing	  strategies	  and	  their	  implications	  for	  the	  legitimacy	  	  of	  IOs.	  
The	   paper	   is	   organized	   as	   follows.	   In	   the	   following	   section,	   we	   elaborate	   on	   the	   concept	   of	  
legitimacy	  and	  representation	  as	  applied	  to	  international	  political	  institutions	  and	  analyze	  the	  strengths	  and	  
weaknesses	   of	   the	   legitimacy-­‐enhancing	   strategies	   that	   have	   been	   primarily	   followed	   by	   international	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 It is possible to conceive of legitimacy and representation in a way that is independent from democratic concerns in 
order to apply them to non-democratic context (Urbinati and Warren 2008).  
bodies.	  Section	  3	  traces	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  legitimacy-­‐enhancing	  in	  the	  EU.	  Section	  4	  does	  the	  same	  for	  
the	  IMF.	  Section	  5	  concludes	  by	  reflecting	  on	  the	  findings.	  
	  	  
2.	  Legitimacy	  and	  legitimacy-­‐enhancing	  strategies	  at	  the	  international	  level	  
	  
Among	   the	  most	   debated	   concepts	   in	   the	   social	   science,	   the	   concept	   of	   legitimacy	   certainly	   occupies	   a	  
special	  place.	  In	  Max	  Weber’s	  reading,	  the	  validity	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  power	  depends	  on	  the	  social	  acceptance	  
by	  those	  affected	  by	  it	  (Weber	  1922).	  As	  Jürgen	  Habermas	  (1976)	  has	  sharply	  pointed	  out,	  the	  concept	  of	  
legitimacy	  usually	  enters	  the	  analytical	  picture	  when	  it	  is	  deficient.	  ‘Only	  when	  a	  regime	  or	  arrangement	  is	  
being	   manifestly	   challenged	   by	   its	   citizens/subjects/victims/beneficiaries	   do	   political	   scientists	   tend	   to	  
invoke	   lack	   of	   legitimacy	   as	   a	   cause	   for	   the	   crisis’	   (Schmitter	   2001:	   1).	   In	   this	   respect,	   legitimacy	   is	   an	  
essential	  condition	  for	  the	  stability	  of	  political	  systems.	  
In	  David	  Beetham’s	   reading,	   political	   power	   can	  be	   said	   to	  be	   legitimate	   to	   the	  extent	   that:	   1)	   it	  
conforms	  to	  established	  rules	  and	  it	  is	  exercised	  according	  to	  them	  (legality);	  2)	  the	  rules	  can	  be	  justified	  by	  
reference	   to	   beliefs	   shared	   by	   both	   rulers	   and	   ruled	   (normative	   justifiability);	   3)	   the	   dominant	   actors	  
holding	   a	   position	   of	   authority	   enjoy	   an	   express	   consent	   on	   the	   part	   of	   subordinates	   (legitimation).	   It	  
follows	  that	  a	  breach	  of	  rules	  triggers	  illegitimacy,	  the	  absence	  of	  shared	  beliefs	  triggers	  legitimacy	  deficit,	  
and	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  ruled’s	  express	  consent	  triggers	  the	  delegitimation	  of	  the	  political	  system	  (Beetham	  
1991:	  17-­‐21).	  
While	  IOs	  have	  no	  difficulties	  in	  matching	  the	  legality	  criterion,	  insofar	  as	  they	  comply	  with	  the	  rule	  
of	   law	  envisaged	  by	   international	   treaties,	   they	  suffer	   from	  both	  a	   legitimacy	  deficit	  and	  a	  delegitimation	  
problem.	   To	   start	   with,	   in	   liberal	   democracies,	   the	   legitimacy	   deficit	   is	   avoided	   when	   the	   normative	  
justifiability	   criterion	   is	   satisfied,	   i.e.	   when	   there	   are	   shared	   beliefs	   between	   rulers	   and	   ruled.	   This	   is	  
possible	  thanks	  to	  performance,	  democratic	  accountability,	  and	  shared	  identity	  (Beetham	  and	  Lord	  1998:	  6-­‐
7).	   Furthermore,	   in	   liberal	   democracies,	   the	   delegitimation	   problem	   is	   avoided	   when	   the	   legitimation	  
criterion	  is	  satisfied,	  i.e.	  when	  there	  is	  an	  express	  consent	  by	  the	  ruled	  towards	  the	  political	  authority.	  This	  
is	  usually	  possible	  thanks	  to	  the	  electoral	  authorization	  (Beetham	  and	  Lord	  1998:	  5).	   In	  contrast,	   IOs	  miss	  
both	  democratic	  procedural	  requirements	  able	  to	  subsume	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  ruled	  and	  clear-­‐cut	  political	  
community	  able	  to	  foster	  identity-­‐building	  processes.	  	  
In	   the	   following	   section,	   we	   review	   two	   legitimacy-­‐enhancing	   strategies	   that	   IOs	   have	   widely	  
employed	   to	  make	   up	   for	   the	   lack	   of	   democratic	   procedural	   requirements	   and	   of	   a	   supporting	   political	  
community.	  These	  strategies,	  which	  figure	  prominently	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  IMF,	  are	  those	  that	  
foster	  participation	  of	  societal	  actors	  and	  those	  that	  emphasize	  the	  expertise	  gains	  associated	  with	  the	  act	  
of	  delegation.	   It	   is	  worth	  clarifying	  that	   the	   legitimacy	  deficit	  of	   the	   IOs	  under	   investigation	  are	  taken	  for	  
granted,	   i.e.	   it	  will	  be	  neither	  empirically	  measured	  nor	  demonstrated6.	  Our	   focus	  will	  be	  on	   the	  process	  
through	  which	   legitimacy	   is	  enhanced	  by	  the	   institutions	  themselves.	  Building	  on	  the	  two-­‐sided	  nature	  of	  
legitimacy	  theorized	  by	  Barker,	  we	  will	  thus	  understand	  of	  legitimacy	  as	  a	  ‘claim	  made	  by	  rulers’	  rather	  than	  
as	  a	  ‘belief	  held	  by	  subjects’	  (Barker	  1990:	  59,	  emphasis	  added).	  	  
	  
2.1	  Participation	  and	  delegation	  to	  experts	  
	  
The	   first	   strategy	   aims	   at	   expanding	   the	   social	   base	   of	   participation	   by	   favoring	   the	   inclusion	   of	   a	   wide	  
numbers	   of	   affected	   parties	   to	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   that	   takes	   place	   in	   international	   or	  
supranational	   bodies.	   This	   strategy	   therefore	   includes	   several	   forms	   of	   procedural	   legitimacy	   such	   as	  
participation	  of	  civil	  society	  groups,	  and	  deliberation	  through	  affected	  parties.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  an	  increased	  
number	   of	   actors	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   aims	   at	   addressing	   problems	   of	   exclusion.	   For	   instance,	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 It is worth specifying, anyhow, that this deficit is controversial in the literature. Kehoane, Macedo and Moravcsik 
(2007: 5-7) have argued that there are at least three conventional defences of multilateral organizations, all of them 
persuasive and widely accepted. Multilateral organizations: a) are indirectly accountable to domestic democracies 
(Grant and Kehoane 2005, Moravcsik 2002); b) are endowed with powers expressely delegated by Member States by 
unanimous consent (Buchanan and Kehoane 2006); c) are able to achieve policy goals that Member States could not 
achieve alone. These positions nothwithstatings, our assumption is that IO still suffer from a legitimacy deficit.  
issue	   area	   of	   finance,	   Mügge,	   Underhill	   and	   Blom	   (2010:	   6)	   note	   that	   ‘only	   a	   limited	   range	   of	   [the]	  
constituencies	  [affected	  by	  financial	  market	  governance]	  have	  been	  included	  in	  policy-­‐making	  at	  either	  the	  
domestic	  or	   international	   levels’.	  Given	  these	  shortcomings,	   the	   inclusion	  of	  different	  stakeholders	   in	   the	  
policy-­‐making	  process	  has	  been	  pursued	  as	  a	  mechanism	  to	   increase	  representativeness	  of	  supranational	  
and	   international	   governance	   (Neshkova	   2010).	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   if	   we	   accept	   the	   argument	   that	   ‘to	   gain	  
legitimacy,	   public	   policies	   require	   the	   endorsement	   (or	   at	   least	   consultation)	   of	   all	   affected,	   then	   global	  
policymaking	  needs	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  broadest	  possible	  participation	  on	  a	  global	  scale’	   (Dallmayr	  2002:	  154-­‐
5).7	   Legitimacy-­‐enhancing	   strategies	   through	   participation	   have	   therefore	   been	   characterized	   by	   various	  
forms	  of	  broadening	  the	  social	  basis	  of	  decision	  making,	  expanding	  the	  range	  of	  participants	  to	  the	  policy	  
process.	  	  
The	   second	   legitimacy-­‐enhancing	   strategy	   is	   related	   to	   the	   process	   of	   delegation	   to	   non-­‐
majoritarian	   institutions	   (Majone	   2005).	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   it	   concerns	   the	   principal-­‐agent	   relationship	   that	  
stands	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  IOs	  (Thatcher	  and	  Stone	  Sweet	  2002;	  Hawkins	  et	  al	  2006).	  Indeed,	  the	  
literature	  on	  delegation	  has	  identified	  several	  factors	  that	  help	  explain	  why	  politicians	  delegate	  powers	  to	  
an	   agent,	   therefore	   justifying	   their	   existence	   and	   legitimacy.	   Several	   studies	   on	   delegation	   in	   domestic	  
settings,	  for	  instance,	  have	  shown	  that	  agents	  are	  created	  and	  delegated	  powers	  largely	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  
expert	   information	   to	   legislators	   (Epstein	   and	   O’Halloran	   1994,	   1999;	   Huber	   1998).	   In	   addition	   to	   the	  
demand	   for	  policy-­‐relevant	   information,	  PA	   studies	  have	   singled	  out	  another	   important	   factor	   that	  helps	  
explain	  the	  functions	  delegated	  to	  an	  agent:	  the	  demand	  for	  credible	  commitments.8	  Given	  the	  high	  costs	  
required	   to	   meet	   commitments,	   principals	   face	   a	   credibility	   problem.	   Therefore,	   they	   delegate	  
enforcement	  commitments	  across	  the	  membership	  (Moravcsik	  2002:	  613).	  
The	  reasons	  that	  stand	  behind	  the	  creation	  of	  international	  agents	  shed	  light	  on	  some	  of	  the	  factors	  
that	   contribute	   to	   their	   legitimacy.	   In	   particular,	   given	   the	   functions	   that	   the	   agents	   are	   expected	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  For	  the	  argument	  in	  favor	  of	  greater	  participation	  in	  global	  governance	  see	  also	  Bevir	  (2010) 
8 In order to ensure credibility, ‘agents no longer represent their principals’ own short term understanding of their 
interests and preferences…acting according to their own independent judgment as to where their principals’ first order 
interests and preferences lie in the long term’ (Bellamy and Castiglione 2011:114). 
perform,	   they	   gain	   their	   legitimacy	  because	  of	   the	   results	   they	   achieve	   and	   the	   resulting	   confidence	   the	  
public	   places	   in	   them	   (Majone	   2001).	   In	   other	   words,	   international	   agents	   gain	   legitimacy	   by	   garnering	  
public	   support	   for	   their	   substantive	   decisions	   (see	   also	   Caldeira	   and	  Gibson	   1992;	  Mondak	   and	   Smithey	  
1997).	  Serving	  the	  common	  interest	  of	  the	  constituency	  (Scharpf	  1999)	  agents	  rely	  on	  an	  ‘output-­‐oriented	  
legitimacy’	  closely	  linked	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  effectiveness.9	  	  
Participation	  and	  delegation	  to	  non-­‐majoritarian	  institutions,	  we	  submit,	  are	  important	  and	  viable	  
tools	  to	  build	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  international	  actors.	  However,	  these	  tools	  may	  fail	  to	  reach	  the	  legitimacy	  
goal.	  This	  happens	  not	  because	   they	  do	  not	  stand	  up	  to	   the	  national	   standard	  of	   legitimacy	  –	   this	  would	  
require	   an	   (inexistent)	   institutional	   isomorphism	   between	   the	   domestic	   and	   the	   international	   political	  
system.	   Rather,	   in	   our	   view,	   participation	   and	   delegation	   to	   experts	   are	   poor	   legitimacy-­‐enhancing	  




For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  the	  principle	  of	  representation	  entails	  a	  bidirectional	  link	  between	  rulers	  and	  
ruled	  based	  on:	  a)	  the	  possibility	  for	  the	  ruled	  to	  authorize	  their	  rulers	  to	  act,	  therefore	  making	  the	  rulers	  
representative	  of	  the	   interests	  and	  needs	  of	  the	  ruled;	  and	  b)	  the	  possibility	  for	  the	  ruled	  to	  control	  their	  
rulers,	   therefore	   making	   them	   responsive	   for	   their	   decisions.10	   In	   other	   words,	   representation	   is	   an	  
inherently	   relational	   concept	   in	   that	   it	   describes	   the	   activities	   of	   representatives	   and	   their	   constituents	  
simultaneously	  as	  they	  relate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  The	  link	  between	  output	  oriented	  considerations	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  IOs	  is	  emphasized	  in	  Scharpf	  2003.	  Echoing	  
Scharpf’s	   insights,	   Frank	   Vibert	   (2007)	   concludes	   that	   ‘unelected	   bodies’	   such	   as	   central	   banks,	   environmental	  
agencies,	   and	   an	   institution	   such	   as	   the	   European	   Commission	   generate	   a	   legitimacy	   of	   their	   own	   through	   the	  
production	  of	  a	  specific	  output/good:	  the	  provision	  of	  information	  to	  citizens.	  	  
 
10 Our definition of representation borrows from what Pitkin (1967) defines as ‘formal representation’. According to the 
formal understanding of representation, indeed, representation takes place through a double process of authorization 
and accountability between rulers and ruled. For a recent application of Pitkin’s grid to EU governance see Bellamy and 
Castiglione 2011: 120-124. 
to	  each	  other	  (Mansbridge	  2003;	  2011).	  Furthermore,	  the	  principle	  of	  representation	  posits	  equality	  among	  
the	  represented,	  which	  finds	  its	  most	  comprehensive	  embodiment	  in	  the	  one-­‐person-­‐one-­‐vote	  procedure.	  
Assessed	   against	   this	   definition,	   participation	   and	   delegation	   to	   experts	   present	   serious	  
shortcomings.	  As	  far	  as	  concerns	  participation,	  this	  strategy	  cannot	  guarantee	  that	  the	  ruled	  authorize	  their	  
rulers	  primarily	  because	   it	  does	  not	  guarantee	  equality	   in	   the	  policy-­‐making	  processes.	  This	  problem	  has	  
been	  widely	  recognized	  and	  several	  suggestions	  have	  been	  advanced	  to	  redress	  it,	  including	  the	  creation	  of	  
citizens’	  juries	  (Warren	  2008),	  the	  provision	  of	  small	  stipends	  to	  make	  public	  sessions	  accessible	  to	  the	  less	  
affluent	  (Rehfelf	  2011:	  634),	  and	  the	  planning	  of	  forums	  on	  public	  policy	  and	  legislation	  –	  what	  have	  been	  
called	  ‘deliberation	  days’	  (Ackerman	  and	  Fishkin	  2004).	  What	  these	  suggestions	  imply	  is	  that	  participation	  
cannot	  guarantee	  the	  equal	  access	  and	  representation	  among	  the	  represented	  when	   it	  allows	  only	   those	  
having	  the	  organizational	  structures	  and	  financial	  resources	  required	  to	  join	  and	  try	  to	  affect	  the	  decision-­‐
making	  process	  (Smismans	  2008).	  
Nowhere	  are	  the	  limits	  of	  participation	  more	  evident	  than	  in	  international	  contexts.	  Indeed,	  several	  
developing	  countries	   lack	  the	  organizational	  and	  analytical	   resources	  to	  actively	  participate	  and	   influence	  
the	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  of	  international	  organizations,	  especially	  when	  technical	  issues	  are	  debated.	  
In	  this	  context,	  even	  some	  important	  transparency	  measures,	  such	  as	  the	  publications	  on	  the	  institutional	  
websites	  of	  agendas	  and	  working	  documents,	  have	  failed	  to	  contribute	  to	   increase	  public	  participation	  to	  
the	   IO	  decision-­‐making	  because	  of	   the	  high	   level	  of	   technicalities	  of	   the	  published	  documents.11	   In	  short,	  
the	  participatory	  strategies	  adopted	  thus	  far	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  represented	  authorize	  
the	  representative	  (the	  IO)	  to	  act.	  
As	   far	   as	   concerns	   delegation	   to	   experts,	   this	   strategy	   can	   be	   criticized	   in	   light	   of	   the	   second	  
dimension	  identified	  above.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  delegation	  to	  experts	  does	  not	  ensure	  the	  responsiveness	  of	  the	  
rulers	  to	  the	  ruled.	  This	  can	  be	  explained	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  at	  least	  two	  set	  of	  factors.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  as	  has	  
been	  noted	  and	  empirically	  demonstrated,	  IOs	  may	  end	  up	  pursuing	  goals	  that	  principals	  had	  not	  intended	  
or	  to	  pursue	  goals	  with	  modalities	  that	  principals	  had	  not	  approved	  –	  i.e.	  agency	  slack	  (Hawkins	  et	  al.	  2006;	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Pollack	   2003:	   28).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   their	   expertise	   may	   shield	   them	   from	   any	   form	   of	   political	  
accountability.	  That	   is,	   the	   increasing	  emphasis	  on	  expertise	  has	  allowed	   IOs	  to	   insulate	  themselves	   from	  
political	  accountability	  when	  the	  output	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  is	  harmful	  of	  broad	  public	  interest.12	  	  
A	   number	   of	   empirical	   observations	   further	   reinforce	   these	   normative	   considerations	   against	  
delegation	  as	   a	   viable	   legitimacy-­‐enhancing	   strategy	   for	   IOs.	   Firstly,	  most	   IOs	   tend	   to	   act	   beyond,	   rather	  
than	   within,	   the	   terms	   of	   delegation	   therefore	   undermining	   their	   representativeness	   –	   the	   so-­‐called	  
problem	  of	  ‘mission	  creep’	  (see	  Nielson	  and	  Tierney	  2003;	  Hawkins	  et	  al.	  2006).	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  EU,	  the	  
activism	  of	  supranational	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  has	  allowed	  the	  EU	  
to	   act	  well	   beyond	   the	   competences	   conferred	   on	   it	   by	   the	  Member	   States,	   thus	   raising	  what	   has	   been	  
referred	  to	  as	  a	   ‘creeping	  competencies	  drift’	  within	   the	  European	   integration	  process	   (Weatherill	  2004).	  
Secondly,	   several	   IOs	  are	  not	   fully	   responsive	   to	   the	  whole	  membership	  either	  because	  voting	   rights	   are	  
skewed	  towards	  certain	  groups	  of	  countries	   (as	   is	   the	  case	   in	   the	   IMF)	   (see	  Woods	  2000)	  or	  because	  the	  
‘experts’	   who	   run	   the	   operations	   of	   IOs	   (Barnett	   and	   Finnemore	   1999)	   are	   only	   partly	   accountable	   to	  
governments	  and	  citizens	  (see	  also	  Machida	  2009:	  376).	  In	  short,	  the	  delegation	  strategies	  adopted	  thus	  far	  
are	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  IOs	  are	  responsive	  to	  the	  representatives.	  
In	  what	  follows,	  we	  show	  how	  two	  prominent	   international	  organizations	  have	  used	  participation	  
and	  delegation	  to	  experts	  to	  achieve	  legitimacy.	  Recently,	  however,	  both	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  IMF	  have	  started	  
complementing	   these	  strategies	  by	  emphasizing	   the	  principle	  of	   representation	   in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways.	  This	  
process	  is	  illustrated	  in	  the	  following	  sections.	  	  
	  	  
3.	  The	  EU	  and	  the	  path	  towards	  legitimacy	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policy they adopt is not exclusively leveled against international bodies. Rather, the criticism has been developed with 
regard to domestic political systems (Schoenbrod 1993). 
The	  European	  Communities	  have	  been	  facing	  legitimacy	  problems	  since	  the	  1970s.	  In	  1975,	  the	  Tindemans	  
Report	  accused	  the	  European	  Economic	  Community	   to	  suffer	   from	  a	   ‘democratic	  deficit’,	  deriving	   from	  a	  
significantly	   low	   involvement	   of	   citizens	   into	   the	   European	   decision	   making	   process,	   which	   was	   almost	  
exclusively	   governed	  by	  national	   executives	  and	  distant	  European	  bureaucrats.	   Since	   then,	   the	  European	  
Communities	   (and	   subsequently	   the	   EU)	   have	   followed	   a	   twofold	   path.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   they	   have	  
attempted	  to	  gain	  standard	  democratic	  legitimacy	  by	  strengthening	  the	  powers	  of	  elective	  bodies.	  On	  the	  
other	   hand,	   they	   have	   devised	   legitimacy-­‐enhancing	   strategies	   ‘alternative	   to	   the	   majoritarian	   avenue’	  
(Dehousse	  1995)	  which	  have	  been	  primarily	  aimed	  at	  strengthening	  participation	  of	  civil	  society	  and	  expert	  
information.	  
During	  the	  1980s,	  the	  legitimacy-­‐enhancing	  strategies	  revolved	  around	  the	  place	  to	  be	  reserved	  to	  
the	  parliamentary	  branch	  within	  the	  European	  institutional	  system.	  In	  1979,	  the	  historic	  decision	  was	  taken	  
to	   make	   the	   European	   Parliament	   (EP)	   directly	   elected	   by	   European	   citizens.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   limited	  
powers	   accorded	   to	   the	   EP	   as	   compared	   to	   those	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Ministers	   and	   of	   the	   European	  
Commission	   did	   not	   satisfy	   the	   demand	   for	   legitimacy.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   EP,	   which	   at	   the	   time	   of	   its	  
establishment	   was	   only	   allowed	   to	   express	   non-­‐binding	   opinions,	   was	   progressively	   endowed	   with	   the	  
same	  legislative	  powers	  of	  the	  Council.	  Indeed,	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Maastricht	  of	  1992	  introduced	  the	  ‘codecision	  
procedure’.	  That	   is	   to	  say,	   the	  EU	  draft	   legislation	  could	  not	  be	  adopted	  without	  a	  shared	  understanding	  
between	  the	  Council,	  representing	  Member	  States,	  and	  the	  EP,	  representing	  European	  citizens.	  
Delegation	   to	   experts	   and	   to	   non-­‐majoritarian	   institutions	   also	   figures	   prominently	   in	   the	   list	   of	  
strategies	  that	  the	  EU	  has	  pursued	  to	  gain	  legitimacy	  over	  time.	  In	  particular,	  by	  strengthening	  the	  powers	  
of	  supranational,	  technical	  bodies,	  such	  as	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  and	  the	  European	  Commission,	  the	  aim	  has	  
been	   to	   improve	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   Union,	   via	   expert	   information.	   Indeed,	   the	  members	   of	   these	  
technical	  bodies	  are	  not	  elected	  by	  popular	  consent,	  but	  appointed	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  legal	  expertise,	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  ECJ,	  and	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  economic	  expertise	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank.	  Since	  
non-­‐majoritarian	   institutions	   manage	   technical	   policy	   areas,	   their	   insulation	   from	   any	   form	   of	   electoral	  
participation	  is	  justified	  since	  they	  often	  deal	  with	  ‘regulatory’,	  rather	  than	  ‘redistributive’	  policies	  (Majone	  
1996).	   Delegation	   has	   been	   particularly	   important	   in	   some	   technical	   fields,	   where	   common	   citizens	   are	  
neither	  willing	  to	  participate	  nor	  able	  to,	  being	   ‘rationally	   ignorant’	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  
policy	  issues	  under	  consideration	  (Moravcsik	  2002:	  614).	  
Participation	  as	  a	  legitimacy-­‐enhancing	  strategy	  has	  been	  a	  late-­‐comer	  in	  the	  European	  integration	  
process	  and	  has	  been	  used	  as	  a	   strategy	   to	   reinforce	   the	   involvement	  of	   citizens	  within	   the	  EU	  decision-­‐
making	  process.	  The	  EU	  started	  to	   institutionalize	  a	  culture	  of	  consultation	  and	  dialogue	  with	  civil	  society	  
especially	   in	   2000,	   following	   the	   publication	   of	   the	   White	   Paper	   on	   Governance.	   Indeed,	   the	   Paper	  
suggested	  that	  ‘participation	  through-­‐out	  the	  policy	  chain	  –	  from	  conception	  to	  implementation’,13	  was	  one	  
of	  the	  five	  principles	  that	  the	  EU	  has	  to	  follow	  to	  reach	  the	  goal	  of	  good	  governance.	  In	  this	  connection,	  civil	  
society’s	   involvement	   was	   expected	   to	   offer	   citizens	   ‘a	   structured	   channel	   for	   feedback,	   criticisms,	   and	  
protest’.14	   Following	   the	  White	   Paper’s	   call	   for	   participation,	   the	   EU	   has	   quickly	   developed	   an	   inclusive	  
approach	   in	   the	   development	   of	   its	   policies.	   In	   2002,	   the	   Commission	   adopted	   a	   Communication	  
establishing	  a	  coherent	  framework	  for	  consulting	  external	  interest	  parties	  and	  setting	  minimum	  standards	  
for	  consultation.15	  
In	   spite	   of	   the	   attempts	   aimed	   at	   making	   the	   EU	   as	   inclusive	   as	   possible,	   the	   EU	   participatory	  
strategies	   have	   mainly	   accommodated	   ‘interested	   parties’	   rather	   than	   ‘affected’	   ones.	   For	   instance,	  
although	  in	  principle	  all	  groups	  and	  associations	  can	  participate	  in	  the	  consultations	  run	  by	  the	  Commission	  
through	  the	  web	  portal	  ‘Your	  Voice	  in	  Europe’,	  since	  there	  is	  not	  a	  legal	  definition	  of	  the	  term	  ‘civil	  society	  
organization’,	   civil	   society	   organizations	   are	   nonetheless	   required	   to	   clarify	  what	   interest	   they	   represent	  
and	  what	   their	  mission	   is	   in	   order	   to	   be	   registered	   accordingly.	   In	   order	   to	   improve	   transparency	   in	   its	  
participatory	  strategies,	  in	  March	  2007,	  the	  Commission	  adopted	  a	  Communication	  on	  the	  Follow-­‐up	  to	  the	  
Green	  Paper	  ‘European	  Transparency	  Initiative’,	  which	  informs	  about	  the	  framework	  in	  which	  lobby	  groups	  
and	   civil	   society	   organisations	   operate.	   Furthermore,	   in	   June	   2008,	   the	   Commission	   launched	   a	   new	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   Commission	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   the	   European	   Communities,	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   Governance.	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   Brussels,	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(2001)	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  final,	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voluntary	   register	   of	   interest	   representatives	   in	   order	   to	   alert	   and	   invite	   in	   the	   consultation	   process	   all	  
those	   registered	   parties	   that	   have	   indicated	   their	   specific	   areas	   of	   interest.	   Despite	   these	   attempts	   to	  
broaden	  the	  scope	  of	  participation	  and	  to	  make	  it	  more	  transparent,	  the	  kind	  of	  representation	  endorsed	  
by	  the	  participatory	  strategies	   is	  still	  a	  selective	  one.	  Moreover,	   the	  unlikeliness	  that	  participating	  parties	  
can	   affect	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   undermines	   the	   authorization/responsiveness	  
mechanisms	   inherent	   in	   the	   principle	   of	   representation.	   The	   recent	   reforms	   to	   the	   EU	   institutional	  
framework,	  however,	  signal	  an	  important	  departure	  from	  the	  ‘representation	  of	  interests’	  pursued	  thus	  far	  
towards	   a	   form	   of	   ‘political	   representation’,	   which	   aims	   at	   involving	   all	   citizens	   on	   equal	   grounds,	   thus	  
giving	  a	  voice	  to	  all	  affected	  parties.	  To	  these	  reforms	  we	  now	  turn.	  
	  
3.1	  The	  EU	  Representative	  Turn	  
	  
The	   Treaty	   of	   Lisbon	   has	   shifted	   the	   balance	   from	   alternative	   legitimacy-­‐enhancing	   strategies	   to	   more	  
traditional	   ones.	   Indeed,	   the	   Treaty	   shows	   a	   strong	   favor	   towards	   classic	   democratic	   channels	   based	   on	  
representative	   democracy.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   drafters	   of	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Lisbon	   have	   focused	   on:	   a)	  
strengthening	   existing	   forms	   of	   representative	   democracy	   and	   of	   electoral	   accountability;	   b)	   introducing	  
new	  authorization	  mechanisms	   so	   to	  making	   the	   EU	  more	   representative	  of	   its	   principals;	   c)	   introducing	  
new	  control	  mechanisms	  so	  to	  making	  the	  EU	  more	  responsive	  to	   its	  represented.	  A	  number	  of	  examples	  
help	  to	  itemize	  this	  trend.	  
	  
a) Enhancing	  representative	  democracy	  
	  
To	  start	  with,	  the	  Treaty	  establishing	  a	  Constitution	  for	  Europe,	  which	  never	  entered	  into	  force	  because	  of	  
the	  failure	  of	  the	  2005	  referendums,	  dedicated	  its	  sixth	  title	  to	  the	  ‘democratic	  life	  of	  the	  Union’	  which	  was	  
conceived	   as	   based	   on	   both	   ‘the	   principle	   of	   representative	   democracy’	   (Art.	   I-­‐46)	   and	   ‘the	   principle	   of	  
participatory	   democracy’	   (Art.	   I-­‐47).	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   proposed	   Constitution	   attributed	   to	   the	  
consultation	   and	   dialogue	   with	   civil	   society	   organizations	   the	   same	   pride	   of	   place	   reserved	   to	   the	  
involvement	   of	   elective	   assemblies	   in	   the	   efforts	   of	   gaining	   democracy	   at	   the	   EU	   level.	   In	   contrast,	   the	  
Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  has	  significantly	  circumscribed	  the	  role	  of	  participation	  simply	  stating	  that	  ‘the	  functioning	  
of	  the	  Union	  shall	  be	  founded	  on	  representative	  democracy’	  (Article	  10	  (1)	  TEU).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  Treaty	  
does	   not	   dedicate,	   as	   the	   Constitution	   for	   Europe	   did,	   a	   specific	   article	   to	   the	   principle	   of	   participatory	  
democracy.16	  
The	   increasing	   attention	   towards	   traditional	   forms	   of	   representation	   and	   away	   from	   alternative	  
strategies	  such	  as	  participation	  can	  also	  be	  detected	  in	  the	  content	  of	  the	  provisions	  on	  the	  ‘democratic	  life	  
of	  the	  Union’	  that	  were	  part	  of	  the	  proposed	  Constitution.	  Indeed,	  the	  provisions	  included	  a	  reference	  to	  
the	   importance	   of	   social	   partners	   and	   the	   autonomous	   social	   dialogue	   (Art.	   I-­‐48),	   the	   European	  
Ombudsman	   entitled	   with	   examining	   complaints	   about	   maladministration	   in	   the	   activity	   of	   the	   Union	  
institutions	   (Art.	   I-­‐49),	   the	   transparency	  of	   the	  proceedings	  of	  Union	   institutions,	   bodies	   and	   agencies	   in	  
order	   to	  promote	   good	  governance	   and	  ensure	  participation	  of	   civil	   society	   (Art.	   I-­‐50),	   the	  protection	  of	  
personal	  data	  (Art.	  I-­‐51)	  and	  the	  status	  of	  churches	  and	  non-­‐confessional	  organizations	  (Art.	  I-­‐52).	  That	  is	  to	  
say,	   according	   to	   the	   proposed	   Constitution,	   the	   democratic	   life	   of	   the	   Union	   rested	   on	   a	   quite	  
comprehensive	   mix	   of	   participation,	   democratic	   representation,	   pluralism,	   transparency,	   respect	   for	  
fundamental	  rights,	  and	  social	  dialogue.	  Interestingly,	  however,	  none	  of	  these	  democratizing	  strategies	  has	  
been	  included	  in	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon,	  at	  least	  not	  in	  the	  provisions	  dedicated	  to	  the	  ‘democratic	  principles’	  
that	  underpin	  the	  Union.	  By	  way	  of	  contrast,	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  contemplates	  a	  new	  provision	  on	  the	  role	  
of	  national	  Parliaments	  as	  a	  building	  bloc	  of	  EU	  democracy.	  In	  short,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  most	  recent	  Treaty	  
amendment	   substantially	   narrows	   the	   concept	   of	   democracy	   and	   conceives	   of	   it	   as	   related	   with	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	   The	   Treaty	   of	   Lisbon	   provisions	   dedicated	   to	   participation	   are	   generic.	   See	   for	   example	   (Article	   10	   (3)	   TEU),	  
according	  to	  which	  ‘every	  citizen	  shall	  have	  the	  right	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  democratic	  life	  of	  the	  Union’,	  and	  (Article	  11	  
(2)	   TEU),	   according	   to	   which	   ‘the	   institutions	   shall	   maintain	   an	   open,	   transparent	   and	   regular	   dialogue	   with	  
representative	  associations	  and	  civil	  society’.	  
traditional	  representative	  channels.	  Indeed,	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  emphasizes	  both	  direct	  (through	  EP)	  and	  
indirect	   (through	   national	   Parliaments)	   forms	   of	   democracy	   as	   legitimacy-­‐enhancing	   strategies	  while	   de-­‐
emphasizing	  the	  role	  of	  participatory	  democracy.17	  
	  
b) Enhancing	  authorization	  and	  representativeness	  
	  
The	   Treaty	   of	   Lisbon	   also	   revises	   the	   provisions	   that	   touch	   on	   the	   delegation	   to	   non-­‐majoritarian	  
institutions,	  trying	  to	  bolster	  the	  link	  between	  those	  institutions	  and	  their	  constituencies,	  i.e.	  trying	  to	  make	  
them	  more	  representative	  and	  responsive.	  To	  start	  with,	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  has	  significantly	   intervened	  
on	   the	   ‘principle	  of	   conferral’	   through	  which	  member	   states	  authorize	   the	  EU	   to	  act	   (Guastaferro	  2012).	  
Indeed,	  the	  European	   institutions	  have	  often	  exploitedthe	  terms	  of	  delegation	  according	  to	  which,	   ‘every	  
action	  by	  the	  Union	  is	  based	  on	  a	  general	  or	  specific	  Treaty	  provision	  empowering	  the	  Union—expressly	  or	  
implicitly—to	   act’	   (Lenaerts	   and	   Desormer	   2002:	   385).	   European	   Community	   action,	   indeed,	   although	  
grounded	  into	  express	  legal	  basis,	  has	  often	  encroached	  upon	  Member	  States’regulatory	  autonomy	  thanks	  
to	  the	  extensive	  interpretation	  of	  those	  legal	  basis	  by	  the	  ECJ.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  put	  an	  end	  what	  has	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “competencies	  creep	  drift”	  of	  the	  EU,	  the	  
drafters	   of	   the	   Treaty	   for	   the	   first	   time,	   the	   Lisbon	   version	   of	   the	   TEU	   envisages	   the	   possibility	   for	   the	  
Member	  States	  to	  reduce	  the	  powers	  conferred	  on	  the	  Union.	  As	  stated	  by	  Article	  48	  TEU,	  proposals	  for	  the	  
amendment	  of	  the	  Treaties	  ‘may,	  inter	  alia,	  serve	  either	  to	  increase	  or	  reduce	  the	  competencies	  conferred	  
on	  the	  Union	  in	  the	  Treaties	  (emphasis	  added)’.	  Moreover,	  the	  drafters’	  intention	  to	  limit	  the	  expansion	  of	  
EU	  powers	  by	  expressly	  authorizing	   its	  actions	   is	  evident	   from	  the	  many	  provisions	  of	   the	  Treaty	   (see	  for	  
example	  Article	  5(2)	  TEU),	  according	  to	  which	   ‘competencies	  not	  conferred	  upon	  the	  Union	   in	  the	  Treaty	  
remain	  within	  the	  Member	  States’.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 As far as concerns the EP, the Treaty of Lisbon has empowered its role in the decision-making process by 
generalizing the co-decision procedure and introducing the possibility for the EP to be involved, for the first time, in the 
revision procedures of the Treaties (in accordance with Article 48 TEU). 
The	  authorization	  mechanisms	  of	  principals	  to	  their	  agents	  are	  also	  bolstered	  by	  the	  clarification	  of	  
the	   vertical	   division	   of	   powers	   between	  Member	   States	   and	   the	   EU.	   The	   Treaty	   of	   Lisbon	   introduces	   a	  
catalogue	  of	  “categories	  and	  areas	  of	  Union	  competence”	   (Articles	  2-­‐6	  TFEU).	  Article	  2	  TFEU	  outlines	   the	  
categories	  of	  Union	  competencies,	  divided	   into	  exclusive,	   shared,	   coordination	  and	  support	   competence.	  
Articles	  3	   to	  6	  TFEU	  enumerate	   the	  areas	  of	   action	  encompassed	  by	  each	  of	   those	   categories.	   This	   is	   an	  
important	  novelty	  since	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  catalogue	  in	  the	  previous	  Treaty	  often	  helped	  to	  blur	  the	  scope	  of	  
EU	  competencies.	  
In	   short,	   the	   strengthening	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   conferral	   emphasizes	   the	   authorization	   model	  
according	  to	  which	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  EU	  (acting	  as	  an	  agent)	  are	  exclusively	  those	  allocated	  to	  it	  voluntarily	  
by	  the	  Member	  States	  (acting	  as	  principals	  and	  ‘Masters	  of	  the	  Treaties’).18	  	  
	  
c) Enhancing	  control	  and	  responsiveness	  
	  
The	   Treaty	   of	   Lisbon	   also	   increases	   the	   control	  mechanisms	   able	   to	  make	   the	   EU	  more	   accountable	   and	  
more	  responsive	  to	  its	  Member	  States	  and	  to	  its	  citizens	  too.	  
Specifically,	   in	   line	  with	  the	  innovations	   introduced	  in	  the	  1990s	  through	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Maastricht	  
and	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Amsterdam,	   which	   required	   the	   Commission	   to	   be	   collectively	   responsible	   to	   the	  
European	  Parliament,	  which	  was	  enabled	  to	  vote	  a	  motion	  of	  censure,	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  has	  changed	  the	  
provisions	   dedicated	   to	   the	   President	   of	   the	   Commission.	   While	   before	   the	   latest	   Treaty	   revision	   the	  
President	  was	  appointed	  by	   the	  Council	  with	   the	  consent	  of	   the	  EP,	   the	  Treaty	  of	   Lisbon	  states	   that	   ‘the	  
European	  Council,	  acting	  by	  a	  qualified	  majority,	  shall	  propose	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament	  a	  candidate	  for	  
President	  of	  the	  Commission.	  This	  candidate	  shall	  be	  elected	  by	  the	  European	  Parliament	  by	  a	  majority	  of	  
its	  component	  members.’	  (Article	  17(7)	  TEU).	  In	  sum,	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  requires	  the	  Commission	  –	  a	  non-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  For	  an	  assessment	  on	  the	  significant	  strengthening	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  conferral	   in	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  and	  on	   its	  
impact	  on	  the	  vertical	  order	  of	  competences	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  its	  Member	  States	  see	  Guastaferro	  (2012).	  
majoritarian,	   expert	   institution	   –	   to	   be	   held	   accountable	   to	   the	   EP	   via	   the	   election	   of	   its	   President	   and	  
confirms	  the	  possibility	  for	  the	  Parliament	  to	  vote	  a	  motion	  of	  censure	  to	  the	  Commission	  as	  a	  body.	  	  
Furthermore,	   the	   mechanisms	   of	   control	   over	   the	   EU	   have	   been	   strengthened	   by	   assigning	   an	  
important	   role	   to	   national	   Parliaments.	   European	   institutions,	   indeed,	   are	   required	   to	   inform	   national	  
Parliaments	   on	   the	   Union	   draft	   legislative	   acts,	   by	   regularly	   transmitting	   them	   (see	   Art.	   12	   TUE).19	   This	  
substantially	  strengthens	  EU’s	  accountability	  to	  national	  legislative	  assemblies,	  which	  are	  endowed	  with	  the	  
power	   to	  warn	   against	   the	   non-­‐compliance	   of	   draft	   legislative	   acts	  with	   the	   principle	   of	   subsidiarity.20	   If	  
reasonable	  doubts	  on	  the	  violation	  of	   the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity	  are	  shared	  among	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  
national	  Parliaments,	  European	   institutions	  must	   review	   the	  draft	   in	  a	  way	   that	   is	   responsive	   to	  national	  
Parliaments’	  claims.21	  
To	   conclude,	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Lisbon	   marks	   a	   significant	   departure	   from	   most	   of	   the	   legitimacy-­‐
enhancing	  strategies	  that	  have	  been	  pursued	  by	  the	  EU	  thus	  far.	  In	  particular,	  the	  most	  recent	  reforms	  to	  
the	  EU	  Treaty	  aim	  at	  strengthening	  the	  link	  between	  decision	  makers	  and	  their	  constituencies	  by	  adopting	  
provisions	  that	  ensure	  that	  the	  represented	  authorize	  their	  representatives	  and	  by	  making	  the	  latter	  more	  
responsive	  towards	  their	  constituencies.	  	  
	  
	  
4.	  The	  IMF	  and	  the	  path	  towards	  legitimacy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 According to Article 12 TEU, national Parliaments contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union by being 
informed by the institutions of the Union on draft legislative acts, by acting as the guardians of the respect of the 
principle of subsidiarity, by taking part in the revision procedures of the Treaties, by taking part in the inter-
parliamentary cooperation between national Parliaments and with the European Parliament 
20 See Article 6 of the “Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality”, and , more 
generally, the “Protocol on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union”. 
21	   According	   to	   Art.	   7	   of	   the	   Protocol	   on	   subsidiarity	   and	   proportionality,	   where	   reasoned	   opinions	   on	   a	   draft	  
legislative	  act’s	  noncompliance	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity	  represent	  at	  least	  one	  third	  of	  all	  votes	  allocated	  to	  
the	  national	   Parliaments,	   the	  draft	  must	  be	   reviewed	  and	   the	   Institutions	  may	  decide	   to	  maintain	   it	   only	  by	   giving	  
adequate	  reasons	  for	  this	  choice.	  
 
	  Whereas	  in	  the	  EU	  the	  debate	  on	  how	  to	  legitimize	  the	  organization	  has	  included	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  place	  
of	   the	   parliamentary	   branch	   in	   the	   EU	   institutional	   system,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   IMF,	   strengthening	   the	  
legislative-­‐elected	  body	  has	  never	  been	  an	  option	  available	  because	  of	   the	  Fund’s	   institutional	   structure.	  
Indeed,	   the	   Fund	   does	   not	   possess	   a	   body	  made	   up	   of	   elected	   officials.	   Rather,	   two	  main	   bodies	   are	   in	  
charge	   of	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   policy-­‐making:	   the	   Executive	   Board,	  where	  member	   states’	   representatives	   sit,	  
and	  IMF	  staff	  members,	  who,	  based	  on	  their	  technical	  expertise,	  formulate	  policy	  proposals	  and	  implement	  
the	  Board’s	  decisions.22	  Although	  the	  IMF	  Executive	  Board	  is	  the	  main	  policy	  making-­‐body,	  being	  in	  charge	  
of	   the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  activities	  of	   the	  organization,	   the	  highest	  political	   authority	   is	   the	  Board	  of	  Governors,	  
where	   each	   of	   the	   187	   member	   countries	   is	   represented	   and	   which	   normally	   meets	   twice	   a	   year.	   The	  
Executive	  Board	   is	   instead	  a	  smaller	  body	  made	  up	  of	  24	  representatives	  and	  sits	   ‘in	  continuous	  session’.	  
Furthermore,	   it	  decides	  on	  virtually	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  Fund’s	  activities,	  from	  financial	  assistance	  programs	  
to	  administrative	  and	  budgetary	  matters.23	  
The	   composition	   of	   the	   Executive	   Board	   and	   its	   decision-­‐making	   process	   have	   been	   a	  matter	   of	  
controversy	   and	   a	   source	   of	   tension	   for	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   organization.	   Although	   the	   IMF	   is	   a	   quasi-­‐
universal	   organization,	   with	   a	   membership	   of	   187	   countries,	   the	   Executive	   Board	   is	   made	   up	   by	   24	  
Directors.	   Specifically,	   whereas	   some	   countries	   have	   their	   own	   representative	   (China,	   France,	   Germany,	  
Japan,	  Russia,	  China,	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  UK,	  US),	  the	  other	  members	  are	  organized	  in	  constituencies.	  On	  top	  of	  
the	  unequal	  representation,	  voting	  rights	  are	  primarily	  allocated	  by	  economic	  size	  –	  i.e.	  the	  quota	  system.	  
As	   a	   result,	   the	   United	   States	   and	   the	  most	   economically	   advanced	   countries	   have	   long	   enjoyed	   a	   veto	  
power	   in	   the	   organization.24	   Nevertheless,	   note	   should	   be	   taken	   that,	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   weighted	   voting	  
system,	  the	  Executive	  Board	  decides	  almost	  exclusively	  by	  consensus	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  diversity	  of	  views	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The staff of the IMF is a textbook example of well-developed and autonomous international bureaucracy. Its 
members, who are primarily recruited from Anglo-American universities, include almost exclusively PhD economists 
with a macroeconomics expertise (Momani 2005; also Chwieroth 2008). 
23 Some issues, however, some issues that remain within the responsibility of the Board of Governors. These issues 
include, for instance, the admittance of new members, compulsory withdrawal of members, and amendments to the IMF 
Articles of Agreement. 
24 To remedy this problem, the IMF has recently embarked on a extensive reform of its governance that will be 
extensively analyzed below. 
and	  minority	  rights	  (Van	  Houtven	  2002).	  However,	  the	  consensus	  rule	  does	  not	  eliminate	  all	  the	  disparities	  
associated	  with	  the	  weighted	  voting	  system	  –	  in	  order	  to	  ascertain	  the	  consensus,	  the	  Managing	  Director	  
has	   to	  assess	  whether	  a	  decision	   is	   supported	  by	  Executive	  Directors	  having	   sufficient	   votes	   to	   carry	   the	  
question	  if	  a	  vote	  were	  taken.	  
As	  is	  the	  case	  in	  other	  international	  organizations,	  primarily	  the	  United	  Nations,	  the	  special	  position	  
that	  some	  member	  countries	  occupy	  within	  the	  organization	  reflects	  the	  distribution	  of	  economic	  power	  at	  
the	  time	  of	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  when	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system	  was	  created	  with	  the	  IMF	  
as	   one	   of	   its	   key	   pillars.	   Over	   time,	   however,	   the	   distribution	   of	   economic	   power	   in	   the	   world	   has	  
significantly	   changed,	   raising	   increasing	   concerns	   about	   the	   legitimacy	  of	   the	   Fund’s	   internal	   governance	  
(Woods	  2000).	  In	  light	  of	  these	  concerns,	  and	  of	  the	  potential	  negative	  impact	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  legitimacy	  for	  
the	   domestic	   implementation	   of	   IMF	   programs	   (Thirkell-­‐White	   2004,	   Best	   2007),	   the	   Fund	   has	   engaged	  
with	  a	  number	  of	  legitimacy-­‐enhancing	  strategies.	  In	  particular,	  the	  Fund	  has	  attempted	  maintaining	  (and	  
recovering)	   its	   legitimacy	  by	  expanding	   the	  number	  of	  actors	   involved	   in	   its	  decision-­‐making	  process	  and	  
adopting	  measures	  to	  improve	  its	  performance	  and,	  therefore,	  the	  benefits	  for	  its	  members.25	  
As	  far	  as	  concerns	  participation,	  the	  IMF	  has	  progressively	  adopted	  a	  number	  of	  measures	  aimed	  at	  
allowing	   exchanges	   not	   only	  with	  member	   countries’	   governments	   and	   central	   banks	   but	   also	  with	   civil	  
society	  organizations,	  including	  NGOs,	  trade	  unions,	  and	  business	  associations.	  In	  particular,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  
the	   1990s,	   the	   IMF	   has	   established	   regular	   meetings,	   seminars,	   and	   consultations	   with	   civil	   society	  
representatives	   both	   at	   Fund	   headquarters	   and	   worldwide	   on	   specific	   policy	   or	   country	   issues.	   A	   Civil	  
Society	   Policy	   Forum,	   running	   in	   parallel	  with	   the	  Annual	   and	   Spring	  Meeting	   of	   the	   IMF	   and	   the	  World	  
Bank,	  was	  created	  to	  permit	  formal	  and	  informal	  interaction	  between	  civil	  society	  representatives	  and	  IMF	  
staff.26	  Furthermore,	  the	  IMF	  started	  inviting	  civil	  society	  organizations	  to	  provide	  comments	  to	  papers	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Interestingly, although the Fund has attempted improving its performance since its creation in the 1940s, the 
legitimacy-enhancing strategies have been systematically pursued by the late 1990s as a result of the emerging market 
crises of the decade and the ensuing contestation of IMF policies that seriously threatened the Fund’s legitimacy and 
effectiveness (Moschella 2010; Seabrooke 2007). The arm-twisting of the US Congress and the repositioning of major 
shareholders also favored the major changes that the Fund has followed in the attempt to reinforce its legitimacy. 
26 The first Civil Society Policy Forum was held during the 2008 Spring Meeting, with more than 200 civil society 
organizations in attendance. 
policy	  reviews.	  The	  Fund	  has	  also	  established	  mechanisms	  to	  involve	  civil	  society	  in	  each	  member	  country,	  
especially	  in	  the	  context	  of	  IMF-­‐negotiated	  financial	  assistance	  programs	  (Scholte	  2009).	  
The	  participatory	  strategy	  has	  been	  supported	  by	  the	  important	  measures	  undertaken	  by	  the	  Fund	  
to	   increase	   the	   transparency	  of	   its	   activities	   and	  decision-­‐making.	   In	   this	   spirit,	   since	   the	  mid-­‐1990s,	   the	  
Fund	  has	  started	  publishing	  the	  in-­‐house	  produced	  policy	  documents,	  including	  country	  reports	  and	  Article	  
IV	   surveillance	   report.	   A	   key	   step	   in	   this	   process	   has	   been	   the	   decision	   to	   open	   the	   Fund’s	   Archives	   for	  
outside	  access	  in	  1996	  with	  a	  stipulated	  time	  lag	  of	  30	  years.	  The	  time	  lag	  was	  shortened	  in	  three	  steps	  in	  
1999,	  2002,	  and	  2009	  and	  the	  wait	  for	  archived	  documents	  is	  now	  3	  years	  for	  staff	  papers	  and	  5	  years	  for	  
Board	  minutes.27	  In	  addition,	  in	  1997,	  the	  Fund	  decided	  to	  make	  public	  the	  Executive	  Board’s	  summary	  of	  
the	  discussion	  for	  Article	  IV	  consultation	  –	  the	  so-­‐called	  Public	  Information	  Notices	  (PINs).	  Another	  step	  in	  
the	  path	  towards	  greater	  transparency,	  was	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Independent	  Evaluation	  Office	  in	  July	  
2001	  (see,	  for	  instance,	  Weaver	  2010).	  The	  IEO,	  whose	  reports	  and	  works	  programs	  are	  publicly	  available,	  is	  
expected	   to	   provide	   objective	   and	   independent	   evaluations	   on	   issues	   related	   to	   IMF	   policies	   and	  
operations.	  
Next	  to	  the	  measures	  aimed	  at	  expanding	  participation	  through	  the	  transparency	  of	  its	  operations,	  
one	   of	   the	   key	   legitimacy-­‐enhancing	   strategies	   pursued	   by	   the	   Fund	   has	   been	   that	   of	   improving	   its	  
performance,	  and	  therefore	  the	  benefits	  it	  delivers	  to	  its	  member	  countries.	  Nowhere	  is	  this	  process	  more	  
evident	  than	  in	  the	  continuous	  update	  of	  the	  IMF	  lending	  facilities.	  Indeed,	  since	  its	  creation,	  the	  Fund	  has	  
kept	  expanding	  the	  repertory	  of	  measures	  it	  uses	  to	  govern	  currency	  and	  financial	  crises,	  creating	  stand-­‐by	  
arrangements,	  extended	  arrangements,	  more	  favorable	  terms	  for	  loans	  to	  cover	  commodity	  price	  shocks	  or	  
loans	   to	   low-­‐income	   countries,	   and	  other	   ad	  hoc	   facilities.	   In	   the	   aftermath	  of	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis,	  
then,	  new	  modes	  of	  policy-­‐making	  and	  new	  lending	  instruments	  have	  appeared	  which	  all	  aim	  at	  speeding	  
up	  policy	  processes	  and	  rendering	  more	  effective	  Fund	  financial	  assistance	  programs.	  Although	  an	  analysis	  
of	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  Fund’s	  lending	  facilities	  would	  require	  a	  paper	  on	  its	  own,	  what	  is	  worth	  noting	  here	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  IMF,	  Review	  of	  the	  Fund’s	  Transparency	  Policy,	  26	  October	  2009,	  Washington	  DC,	  International	  Monetary	  Fund.	  
is	   that	   the	   Fund	   has	   created	   new	   facilities	   to	   accommodate	   the	   changing	   needs	   of	   its	  membership.	   For	  
instance,	   it	  has	  created	   lending	   facilities	  specifically	   tailored	  to	   the	  development	  needs	  of	   its	   low-­‐income	  
countries.	   Likewise,	   it	   has	   developed	   facilities	   that	   are	  meant	   to	   satisfy	   the	   liquidity	   needs	   of	   emerging	  
market	  countries	  in	  the	  event	  of	  systemic	  crises.	  In	  short,	  the	  Fund	  has	  created	  outputs	  that	  were	  meant	  to	  
be	  beneficial	  for	  its	  membership	  and	  that	  could	  thus	  legitimize	  its	  activity.	  
In	  spite	  of	  the	  importance	  attached	  to	  participation	  and	  to	  the	  update	  of	  its	  activities	  as	  means	  to	  
enhance	  its	  legitimacy,	  the	  IMF,	  like	  the	  EU,	  has	  recently	  taken	  new	  and	  more	  radical	  measures	  to	  enhance	  
its	   legitimacy.	  These	  measures	  are	  meant	  to	  strengthen	  the	  bidirectional	   link	  between	  rulers	  and	  ruled	  as	  
embodied	  in	  the	  mechanism	  of	  authorization/representativeness	  and	  control/responsiveness.	  	  
	  
4.1	  The	  IMF’s	  representative	  turn	  	  
	  
Although	  the	  Fund	  has	  continued	  to	  pursue	  legitimacy	  via	  participation	  and	  transparency,	  and	  the	  path	  of	  
enhancing-­‐legitimacy	  via	  the	  benefits	  provided	  to	  its	  members,	  the	  IMF	  has	  also	  started	  adopting	  a	  number	  
of	   measures	   that	   move	   beyond	   these	   legitimacy-­‐enhancing	   strategies	   by	   embracing	   the	   principle	   of	  
representation.	   This	   move	   is	   well-­‐illustrated	   by	   the	   debate	   on	   the	   2008-­‐2010	   quota	   and	   voice	   reform,	  
which	   has	   been	   regarded	   as	   ‘crucial	   for	   increasing	   the	   legitimacy	   and	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   Fund’.28	  
Specifically,	   similarly	   to	   what	   is	   taking	   place	   in	   the	   EU	   with	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Lisbon,	   the	   IMF	   has	   started	  
focusing	   on	   a)	   the	   introduction	   of	   new	   authorization	   mechanisms	   so	   to	   making	   the	   Fund	   more	  
representative	   of	   its	   principals;	   b)	   the	   introduction	   of	   new	   control	  mechanisms	   making	   the	   IMF	   more	  
responsive	  to	  its	  represented.	  A	  number	  of	  examples	  help	  to	  itemize	  this	  trend.	  
	  
a) Enhancing	  authorization	  and	  representativeness	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Communiqué of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the Board of Governors of the International 
Monetary Fund, The International Monetary and Financial Committee, October 4, 2009 Istanbul (emphasis added). 
	  The	   2008	   reform,	   which	   came	   into	   effect	   on	   March	   2011,29	   contains	   important	   innovations	   in	   the	  
mechanisms	   through	   which	   member	   states	   authorize	   the	   activities	   of	   the	   IMF:	   that	   is,	   the	   voting	  
mechanisms	  within	  the	  organization.	  Indeed,	  the	  reform	  brought	  about	  a	  reshuffle	  in	  the	  relative	  shares	  of	  
the	  advanced	  and	  developing	  countries,	  shifting	  shares	  away	  from	  over-­‐represented	  to	  under-­‐represented	  
countries.30	   Specifically,	   the	   reform	   has	   strengthened	   the	   representation	   of	   emerging	   market	   countries	  
through	  ad	  hoc	  quota	   increases	  for	  54	  members.	  Furthermore,	  the	  quota	  and	  voice	  reform	  has	   improved	  
the	  representation	  of	  low-­‐income	  countries	  through	  an	  almost	  tripling	  of	  basic	  votes	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  amount	  
of	   votes	   that	   are	   assigned	   on	   an	   equal	   basis	   to	   all	  members	   independent	   of	   the	   quota-­‐based	   shares.	   In	  
short,	   the	   reform	   has	   marked	   an	   important	   step	   in	   the	   path	   towards	   a	   wider	   and	   more	   equal	  
representation	   of	   the	   Fund’s	   membership,	   improving	   the	   degree	   of	   representativeness	   of	   the	  
organization.31	  
Following	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  2008	  quota	  and	  voice	  reform,	  the	  IMF	  has	  not	  abandoned	  the	  new	  
path	  of	  legitimacyvia	  representation.	  Indeed,	  following	  the	  burst	  of	  the	  recent	  global	  financial	  crisis	  and	  the	  
G20	  support	  for	  reforming	  IMF	  governance,	  on	  December	  2010,	  the	  Board	  of	  Governors	  approved	  a	  major	  
reform	   that	   aims	   at	   increasing	   the	   voice	   and	   representation	   of	   the	   emerging	   market	   and	   developing	  
countries.32	  While	   it	   is	  probably	   too	  early	   to	   claim	   that	   the	   reform	   is	   ‘the	  most	   fundamental	   governance	  
overhaul	  in	  the	  Fund’s	  65-­‐year	  history’	  as	  the	  former	  Managing	  Director	  Dominique	  Strauss-­‐Khan	  put	  it,33	  it	  
is	  nonetheless	  possible	  to	  identify	  some	  trends.	  In	  particular,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  note	  that	  the	  2010	  reform	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The quota and voice reform came into effect with the acceptance of the ‘Voice and Participation’ amendment to the 
Articles of Agreement by 117 member countries representing 85 percent of the total voting power. 
30 For an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the revised quota formula see, for instance Elson (2001: 182) 
31 For an overview of the content of the 2008 quota and voice reform see, for instance, IMF, Reform of Quota and Voice 
in the International Monetary Fund-Draft Report of the Executive Board to the Board of Governors, 28 March 2008. 
32  IMF Executive Board Approves Major Overhaul of Quotas and Governance, Press Release No. 10/418 November 5, 
2010. Available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10418.htm.  
33  Ibid.  
staked	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   strengthening	   the	   representativeness	   of	   the	   Fund	   is	   a	   key	   input	   to	   its	  
legitimacy.34	  
Indeed,	   the	  core	  of	   the	  reforms	   is	  a	  doubling	  of	   IMF	  quotas	   that	  will	  produce	  a	  shift	  of	  around	  6	  
percent	  of	  quota	  shares	  to	  emerging	  market	  and	  developing	  countries.	  Moreover,	  the	  total	  shift	   in	  voting	  
share	  to	  emerging	  market	  and	  developing	  countries	  as	  a	  whole	  will	  be	  5.3	  percent,	  when	  combined	  with	  
the	  2008	  quota	  and	  voice	  reform.35	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  10	  largest	  members	  of	  the	  Fund	  will	  now	  consist	  of	  the	  
United	   States,	   Japan,	   the	   four	   largest	   European	   economies	   (France,	   Germany,	   Italy,	   and	   the	   United	  
Kingdom)	   and	   Brazil,	   China,	   India,	   and	   the	   Russian	   Federation	   (the	   BRICs).	   In	   addition,	   the	   voice	   of	   the	  
poorest	   developing	   nations	   within	   the	   IMF	   will	   be	   maintained	   by	   preserving	   their	   voting	   shares	   and	  
reviewing	  the	  current	  quota	  formula.	  
In	  short,	  the	  revision	  of	  voting	  shares	  within	  the	  organization	  introduces	  important	   innovations	  in	  
the	  authorization	  mechanism	  that	  stands	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  process	  of	  delegation	  of	  powers	  to	  the	  Fund.	  
With	   the	  voting	   shares	   rebalanced	   towards	  emerging	  and	  developing	   countries,	   the	   IMF	   should	   seek	   the	  
authorization	  of	  a	  much	  wider	  segment	  of	  its	  membership	  to	  act	  than	  as	  been	  the	  case	  thus	  far.	  	  
	  
b) Enhancing	  control	  and	  responsiveness	  
	  
Next	   to	   making	   the	   IMF	   more	   representative	   by	   revising	   member	   countries’	   voting	   shares,	   the	   recent	  
reform	   to	   the	   IMF	   governance	   also	   attempts	  making	   the	   Fund	  more	   responsive	   by	   clarifying	   the	   control	  
mechanisms	  that	  member	  states	  can	  use	  to	  hold	  the	  Executive	  Directors	  to	  account	  for	  their	  decisions.	  This	  
is	  well	  exemplified	  in	  the	  December	  2010	  proposed	  reform	  agreement	  according	  to	  which	  all	  the	  members	  
of	  the	  Executive	  Board	  will	  be	  selected	  through	  an	  electoral	  process	  to	  which	  member	  states	  participate.	  In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 The link between the core of the reform proposal and legitimacy is immediately evident in the first paragraph of the 
blueprint of the agreement where it reads that ‘the membership is converging on quota and governance reforms essential 
to the Fund’s legitimacy and effectiveness as an impartial guardian of global economic stability’. IMF, IMF Quota and 
Governance Reform - Elements of an Agreement, 31 October 2010, Washington D:C:, International Monetary Fund: 1. 
35 IMF, IMF Quota and Governance Reform - Elements of an Agreement, 31 October 2010: 5.  
short,	   the	   proposed	   reform	   suggests	   introducing	   an	   ex	   ante	   control	   mechanisms	   to	   keep	   the	   Executive	  
Board	  in	  check.	  36	  
At	  present,	   the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  establish	   two	   categories	  of	   Executive	  Directors:	   those	  who	  
are	  appointed,	  and	  those	  who	  are	  elected	  –	  given	  its	  current	  size	  of	  24	  Executive	  Directors,	  5	  Director	  are	  
and	  19	  are	  elected.	   Instead,	   the	  proposed	  2010	  amendment	  of	   the	  Articles	   is	  meant	   to	  eliminate	   such	  a	  
disparity	   of	   	   representation	   among	   of	   IMF	   members	   making	   the	   Fund’s	   responsive	   to	   the	   whole	  
membership.37	  In	  order	  to	  establish	  an	  Executive	  Board	  consisting	  solely	  of	  elected	  Executive	  Directors,	  the	  
proposed	   amendment	   requires	   the	   Board	   of	  Governors	   to	   adopt	   regulations	   (by	   a	  majority	   of	   the	   votes	  
cast)	  that	  would	  govern	  the	  conduct	  of	  each	  regular	  election.	  These	  regulations	  will	  establish	  a	  limit	  on	  the	  
total	   number	   of	   votes	   that	  more	   than	   one	  member	  may	   cast	   for	   the	   same	   candidate.	   This	   limit	   will	   be	  
designed	  to	  avoid	  excessive	  concentration	  of	  voting	  power	  in	  multi-­‐country	  constituencies,	  while	  allowing	  
for	  adequate	  flexibility	  to	  enable	  members	  to	  form	  constituencies	  on	  a	  voluntary	  basis.38	  
Furthermore,	  in	  the	  attempt	  to	  increase	  the	  responsiveness	  of	  the	  Fund	  towards	  its	  membership	  at	  
large,	   part	   of	   the	   agreement	   includes	   a	   commitment	   to	   reduce	   the	   number	   of	   Executive	   Directors	  
representing	  advanced	  European	  countries	  by	  two	  in	  favor	  of	  emerging	  market	  countries.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  
the	  former	  Managing	  Director,	  ‘there	  will	  be	  two	  fewer	  seats	  for	  advanced	  European	  countries.	  They	  have	  
agreed	  to	  do	  it,	  agreed	  to	  the	  metric	  to	  do	  it,	  and	  the	  timetable.	  When	  this	  will	  be	  completed,	  there	  will	  be	  
two	   more	   emerging	   countries	   in	   the	   Board	   which	   will	   just	   reflect	   the	   change	   in	   quotas’.39	   Beyond	   the	  
agreed	  tenets	  of	  the	  reform,	  progress	  is	  also	  expected	  in	  other	  related	  areas.	  In	  particular,	   improvements	  
are	   expected	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   selection	   of	   Fund	   management	   based	   on	   an	   open,	   merit-­‐based	   and	  
transparent	  process.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 As of December 12, 2011, 38 members having 30.08 percent of the total voting power had accepted the proposed 
amendment to reform the Executive Board. IMF, IMF Executive Board Reviews Progress Toward Implementation of 
the 2010 Quota and Governance Reform, Press Release No. 11/486, 22 December 2011. Available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11486.htm  
37 IMF, Fourteenth General Review of Quotas and Reform of the Executive Board—Report of the Executive Board to 
the Board of Governors, 5 November 2010: 23- 43, in IMF, IMF Quota and Governance Reform - Elements of an 
Agreement, 31 October 2010. 
38 IMF, Fourteenth General Review of Quotas and Reform of the Executive Board—Report of the Executive Board to 
the Board of Governors, 5 November 2010: 29. 
39 IMF Survey, IMF Board Approves Far-Reaching Governance Reforms, 5 November 2010. Available at 
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In	  conclusion,	  IMF	  governance,	  as	  much	  as	  global	  financial	  governance,	  has	  largely	  been	  perceived	  
as	  neither	   representative	  of	   the	  diversity	  of	   the	   countries	   in	   the	   global	   system,	  nor	  particularly	   inclusive	  
(Underhill	   and	   Zhang	   2008).	   This	   perception	   has	   been	   compounded	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Fund	  has	   taken	  
measures	  to	   improve	  participation	  and	  output	  as	  substitutes	  rather	  than	  complements	  of	  more	  profound	  
strategies	   linked	   to	   representation.	   The	   latest	   reforms	   therefore	   represent	   an	   interesting	   novelty.	   In	  
particular,	   although	   the	   2010	   reforms	   have	   yet	   to	   come	   into	   force,	   they	   signal	   an	   important	   shift	   from	  
previous	  attempts	  at	  legitimizing	  the	  Fund	  through	  participation	  and	  transparency.40	  Indeed,	  the	  proposed	  
reforms	   are	   staked	   on	   the	   principles	   of	   representation	   as	   conceived	   in	   this	   paper,	   requiring	   both	  
authorization	  from	  principals	  to	  agents	  (to	  make	  the	  agent	  representative)	  and	  control	  over	  the	  agent	  (to	  




In	   recent	   years,	   the	   quest	   for	   legitimacy	   has	   become	   a	   key	   task	   for	   several	   IOs.	   Next	   to	   ethical	  
considerations,	  this	  quest	  has	  been	  driven	  by	  the	  serious	  concerns	  over	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  IOs’	  activities	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  legitimacy	  (Backstrand	  2008:	  79;	  Thirkell-­‐White	  2004;	  Zürn	  2002).	  This	  paper	  has	  
tackled	  the	  debate	  on	   IOs	  and	   legitimacy	  attempting	   to	   identify	   the	  major	  strategies	   that	   two	  prominent	  
IOs	  have	  followed	  to	  redress	  their	  broken	  legitimacy.	   In	  this	  respect,	  we	  focused	  on	  participation	  and	  the	  
production	  of	  beneficial	  output	  as	  two	  key	  strategies	  that	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  IMF	  have	  systematically	  pursued	  
over	   time.	   While	   much	   scholarship	   criticizes	   these	   legitimacy-­‐enhancing	   strategies	   based	   on	   the	  
comparison	  with	   the	   standards	  of	   legitimacy	   that	  usually	   apply	   to	  domestic	   political	   systems,	  we	  argued	  
that	   the	  problems	  of	   increased	  participation	  and	   improved	  output	   as	   legitimacy-­‐enhancing	   stragegies	  do	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	   For	   the	   realignment	   of	  members’	   quota	   shares	   and	   the	  moving	   to	   an	   all-­‐elected	   Board	   to	   come	   into	   effect,	   the	  
following	   conditions	   are	   required:	   (1)	   the	   proposed	   amendment	   to	   the	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   on	   reform	   of	   the	  
Executive	  Board	  needs	   to	  be	  accepted	  by	  at	   least	   three-­‐fifths	  of	   IMF	  members	   representing	  85	  percent	  of	   the	   total	  
voting	   power,	   and	   (2)	   members	   representing	   at	   least	   70	   percent	   of	   the	   total	   quotas	   on	   5	   November	   2010	   must	  
consent	  in	  writing	  to	  their	  quota	  increases.	  	  
not	  lie	  on	  their	  decoupling	  from	  domestic-­‐like	  electoral	  mechanisms.	  Rather,	  we	  argued	  that	  the	  problem	  
with	  these	  strategy	  lie	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  do	  not	  comply	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  representation,	  i.e.	  they	  do	  
not	   ensure	   the	  workings	  of	   the	  bidirectional	   link	  between	   rulers	   and	   ruled	   (see	  Pitkin	   1967,	  Mansbridge	  
2003,	  2011).	   In	  particular,	  strategies	  adopted	  thus	  far	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  represented	  
authorize	  the	  representative	  (the	  IO)	  to	  act	  and	  that	  the	  IOs	  are	  responsive	  to	  the	  representatives.	  
Our	  normative	  argument	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  representation	  is	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that,	  absent	  
the	   bidirectional	   link	   between	   rulers	   and	   ruled,	   both	   participation	   and	   delegation	   do	   not	   constitute	  
legitimacy	   enhancing	   strategies.	   When	   both	   the	   strategies	   fail	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   principle	   of	  
representation—i.e.	  detach	  the	  rulers	  from	  the	  ruled—they	  do	  not	  enshrine	  the	  relational	  quality	  which	  is	  
inherent	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  legitimacy.	  Indeed,	  in	  its	  very	  essence,	  legitimacy	  is	  a	  “relational”	  concept	  since	  it	  
represents	   the	  quality	  of	  a	  power	   relationship	  between	  governors	  and	  subordinates.	  Legitimacy	  converts	  
power	  into	  authority	  –	  “Macht	  in	  Herrschaft”	  –	  and	  simultaneously	  establishes	  an	  obligation	  to	  obey	  and	  a	  
right	  to	  rule	  (Weber	  1922).	  In	  this	  reading,	  when	  the	  output	  of	  the	  agent	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  will	  of	  its	  
principals,	   then	   performance	   cannot	   provide	   the	   agent	   with	   what	   Beetham	   (1991)	   identifies	   as	   the	  
normative	   justifiability	  of	  political	  authority,	  since	   it	   is	  not	  grounded	  in	  shared	  beliefs	  between	  rulers	  and	  
ruled.	  	  Along	  not	  dissimilar	  lines,	  when	  participation	  	  does	  not	  allow	  affected	  parties	  to	  have	  a	  say	  and	  to	  
influence	  the	  decision	  making	  process,	  it	  can	  not	  be	  considered	  a	  legitimation	  strategy,	  i.e.	  something	  that	  
in	  Beetham’s	  reading	  subsumes	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  ruled.	  	  
	   Moving	   from	   the	   normative	   to	   the	   empirical	   level,	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   legitimacy-­‐enhancing	  
strategies	  pursued	  by	  the	  two	  organizations	  suggests	  that,	  recently,	  both	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  IMF	  have	  adopted	  
or	  are	  discussing	  measures	  meant	  to	  strengthen	  the	  bidirectional	  link	  between	  rulers	  and	  ruled.	  That	  is	  to	  
say,	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   IMF	   have	   recently	   turned	   to	   measures	   that	   aim	   at	   improving	   the	   principle	   of	  
representation	   in	   their	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   activities.	   While	   it	   is	   probably	   too	   early	   to	   assess	   whether	   this	  
‘representative	  turn’	  will	  redress	  the	  legitimacy	  deficits	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  IMF	  and	  whether	  is	  the	  rhetoric	  
or	   the	   practice	   of	   representation	   that	   prevails,	   the	   measures	   adopted	   are	   nonetheless	   an	   interesting	  
development	  because	  they	  demonstrate	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  two	  strategies	  pursued	  thus	  far.	  	  
Although	  we	  have	  emphasized	  the	  similarities	  between	  the	  ‘representative	  turns’	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  
IMF,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   highlight	   some	   important	   differences	   between	   the	   two	   case-­‐studies	   as	   a	  word	  of	  
conclusion.	   Indeed,	   in	  spite	  of	   the	  common	  trend	  towards	  the	  adoption	  of	  measures	  aimed	  at	  enhancing	  
representation,	   important	  differences	   exist	   in	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	  EU	  and	   the	   IMF	  have	  developed	   the	  
principle	  of	  representation.	  In	  particular,	  the	  institutional	  framework	  of	  the	  two	  organizations	  has	  certainly	  
shaped	  the	  way	  in	  which	  representation	  has	  been	  brought	  back	  in.	  Whereas	  in	  the	  EU	  the	  ‘representative	  
turn’	  has	  mainly	  revolved	  around	  the	  role	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  that	  of	  national	  Parliaments,	  in	  
the	   IMF,	  where	  no	   legislative	   assembly	   exists,	   the	   emphasis	   on	   the	  principle	  of	   representation	  has	  been	  
translated	   into	   a	   revision	   of	   the	   role	   of	   member	   governments	   into	   the	   organization,	   leaving	   outside	  
national	   parliaments.	   These	   differences	   have	   led	   the	   EU	   to	   the	  most	   advanced	   experiment	   in	   enhancing	  
legitimacy	   	   through	   the	   principle	   of	   representation	   as	   exemplified	   in	   the	   measures	   that	   aims	   at	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